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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

)
)
)

v.
J.R. MILLER
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)

Case #
Priority #

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case was tried before a jury in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand
County, State of Utah. Defendant was found guilty of second degree felony auto theft and class
A misdemeanor theft. Appellant appeals from this decision. The Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(e) (1953), as amended.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1. The trial Court erred in allowing the officers to offer uncorroborated hearsay
statements. These improper admission were harmful and constituted reversible error.
Standard of Review.
"In general we review the trial Court's determination of the admissibility of
evidence under the correctness standard . . .
An erroneous decision to exclude or admit evidence does not constitute reversible

error unless the error is harmful. See State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241
(Utah 1993). An error is harmful mif absent the error there is a reasonable
likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant."1 State v. White, 880
P.2d 18, 21 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1221); see also
Featherson, 781 P.2d at 431. In other words, "[f]or an error to require reversal,
the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine
confidence in the verdict." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). "
State v. Alonzo. 932 P.2d 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. J.R. Miller, (hereinafter "Mr. Miller") met Sylvia Loren Rodriguez (hereinafter "Ms.
Rodriguez") in June of 1998 (R000039) at the Swayze Campground where she had gone to camp
and run the Swayze Rapids (R000040). Ms. Rodriguez's plan was to meet friends at this
campground, but she arrived before they did (R000040). Shortly after Ms. Rodriguez arrived at
the campground in her Geo Tracker, she met Mr. Miller who was also camping at this
campground (R000040-R000041) This meeting occurred when she struck up a conversation
with him about where he was camping (R000041).
Shortly after this initial conversation, Mr. Miller noticed Ms. Rodriguez setting up her
camp. He approached her and offered his assistance (R000041). She accepted and Mr. Miller
helped her put her camp together (R000042). According to Ms. Rodgriquez, Mr. Miller helped
her for approximately two hours (R000042). While they worked together they talked (R000042).
She told him of the river trip that she had planned (R000042). Afterwards, she gave him a
couple of beers (R000043). Ms. Rodriguez saw Mr. Miller throughout that day and later that
evening (R000043). At one point, Ms. Rodriguez asked Mr. Miller to watch her campsite and
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gear while she went into town (R000043). When she returned, Mr. Miller was watching her
camp as she had asked him to do (R000044). She continued to hang out with him for a while and
then he went back to his own campsite (R000044).
Later, Ms. Rodriguez's friends arrived (R000044) and she spent the remainder of that day
and most of the next day with them. However, she saw Mr. Miller around during this time since
his campsite was very close to hers (R000041 & R000044). Ms. Rodriguez's friends left to go
sightseeing, but Ms. Rodriguez stayed behind (R000044). While her friends were gone, Mr.
Miller came to visit her (R000045). Ms. Rodriguez again gave Mr. Miller a few beers and they
talked about life in general. (R000045). During one of these conversations, they discussed the
Geo Metro that Mr. Miller had been driving and had with him. Mr. Miller told Ms. Rodriguez
that he liked convertible cars (R000047).
On or about the morning of the 13th, Ms. Rodriquez arose and she and her friends went
out on the river (R000045). She saw Mr. Miller that morning, but did not speak with him.
(R000046). At this point, Mr. Miller was out of money, out of gas, and out of food (R000087 &
R000111). While Ms. Rodriguez was gone, Mr. Miller packed up Ms. Rodriguez's possessions,
got into her Geo Tracker and left the Swayze Campground area (R000087). Mr. Miller left
behind the Geo Metro that he had been driving (R000089).
Approximately four (4) days later, Mr. Miller was arrested approximately seventy (70)
miles from the Swayze campsite (R000083-R000084). Mr. Miller admitted personally and
through counsel that the above facts are true. (R000121 and R000155-R000158).

Mr. Miller was not seeking an acquittal at trial (R000031). Instead, he was seeking a
verdict of guilt to the lesser offense of "unlawful control over a motor vehicle" rather than second
degree felony "auto theft" (R000097 and R000151-R000155). He sought this based upon the
theory that he did not intend to keep Ms. Rodriguez's car and camping gear permanently, but that
he would have returned it when he went back for the Geo Metro that he left behind at Swayze
Campground (R000031; R000097; and R000151-R000155).
During the State's case, Officer Kim Neil testified that the Geo Metro Mr. Miller had
been driving had been stolen (R000089). This statement was hearsay (R000098). The State
offered no non-hearsay evidence to substantiate this statement. Mr. Miller claimed to have
borrowed the Geo Metro from a woman and the Geo Metro was turned over by police to this
very same woman (R000105). Mr. Miller, through counsel, objected to this hearsay statement
and moved for a mistrial (R000089). The judge sustained Mr. Miller's objection (R000089).
Shortly thereafter, the jury was excused from the courtroom and the following colloquy took
place regarding counsel's objection to this hearsay and his motion for a mistrial:
THE COURT: . . . The issue we need, the record will show the court's in session
outside the hearing of the jury. The issue we have is whether the conversation
that the defendant had with the police about the Metro is admissible or not and if
its inadmissable, then what should be the consequence of what was (inaudible)
having come in. You did talk to him about the Metro?
KIM NEAL: Yes I did.
THE COURT: And he told you that it was stolen, is that right?
KIM NEAL: It was listed as stolen and I knew it had been listed as stolen.
THE COURT: What did he tell you about it?
KIM NEAL: He said he had borrowed it from a friend.
MR. SCHULTZ: And that's what he testified, in his testimony, when you said
that he told you it was stolen, that's not what he testified.
-4-

THE COURT: Right. So the defendant claims that he borrowed it from a friend,
but you knew that it was listed stolen?
KIMNEAL: Yes.
THE COURT: There's no dispute that the fact that it was listed as stolen is
hearsay, and is therefore admissible.
MR. BENGE: Correct, your Honor. And I guess I would say first of all, I didn't
elicit that testimony. Number two, Mr. Schultz did bring up the issue with Ms.
Rodriguez that that vehicle was there and was still there at the time she left and
third there's been no motions in limiting file of this matter and this was a matter
that innocently came up.
THE COURT: Okay. I actually think that the jury is entitled to hear any
admissible evidence that would explain to them why it is he left the Metro there,
because I fully expect Mr. Schultz to point out to the jury, look he intended to
bring it back, he left his car there. The fact that it was listed as stolen is not
however, admissible, so that should not have come in.
MR. SCHULTZ: I guess I have some concerns as to whether or not its
(inaudible) or not. I mean, I don't gave any (inaudible), but I guess I have some
concerns to how innocent it is from the officer, I mean, I don't challenge the fact
that the defense, you know, was in the camp for too long of a time, but I don't
have to disclose my strategies in this and that and I have a lot of burdens that the
State has to carry and presumptions in my favor, but in this particular case, I
already have disclosed by strategy and that is that we're going for a lesser offense,
that this was a joy ride thing and I think that the officer may have gotten some
presumption of that as well as from my questioning, and that answer was not
really a response to the question that was asked. I mean, it was kind of
spontaneous and that's why my concern was in my objection. I think the court
should inquire to why that response was given, find out how that came up. It
wasn't something I could have made an object to before.
KIM NEAL: The question was asked what we talked about and what I asked the
subject on the ride into town and that was one of the things I asked him.
THE COURT: Okay. What did you ask him on the ride into town?
KIM NEAL: I asked him about the Geo Metro, where it came from, who it
belonged to, how he was in possession of it.
THE COURT: You see, that's all fine. But what you knew from another source is
not, because that's hearsay, you see. When somebody tells you something and
intending to assert that it's true, okay, sometimes we just, we just let people know
about things, but sometimes, what matters is that we told them or we said, but in
this case what matters is whether it's true that it's stolen or not and that was
someone, the person that knows that that other vehicle was stolen is somewhere
else, and of course, the defendant knows, I mean, he didn't admit it, so if the
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defendant admitted, he had admitted to you that it was stolen, that's fine. But
bringing in that somebody else told you that, that's not fine. You're conversation
with him, that's fine, except if you say to him, well this is reported stolen, of
course, then that introduces someone else's hearsay statement. Well, I don't like
it. (Tr. Transcript p. 95, line 22 through p. 99 line 4)
After additional argument, the judge relented and allowed the hearsay without offering
explanation as to how this hearsay was allowable under any exception to the hearsay rule.
(R000102). The following colloquy formed the basis for the Court's decision to do so:
MR. BENGE: Your Honor, before we bring the jury in, I kind of curtailed my
questioning in that regards as soon as Mr. Schultz made his motion for mistrial.
I'd like leave to reopen my . . .
THE COURT: And you want to ask about what the defendant said.
MR. BENGE: Said about the vehicle, both on the 16th interview and then also the
one on the 22nd.
THE COURT: Okay, you can do that. Mr. Neal, be clear that I want you to
understand, don't talk about what anybody told you.
MR. BENGE: However, let me just sort of tell you what I'm going to say before,
in case Mr. Schultz wants to head be off at the pass to avoid a problem. I'm going
to ask him about the interview on the 22nd and ask him if anything was stated
about that Geo Metro and I believe that he'll probably say that the defendant said
he had borrowed it about a friend and then either Mr. White or Mr. Neal, I can't
remember which from the tape, said, "Well, we have indication it was stolen," to
which the defendant replied, "Well, I guess I did keep it longer than I was
supposed to."
THE COURT: Okay, alright. Well, with that, that really constitutes an admission
or at least could be considered as an admission that it was stolen and I think you
have to elicit, you have to elicit the context for that admission, so I'm going to let
you do that and I think it pretty much takes all of the sting out of what came in
already. So, I'm certainly not going to grant a mistrial now.
(Tr. Transcripts p. 101, line 16 through p. 102, line 19)
At that point, the jury returned (R000102) and Officer White testified as follows
(R000122):
. . . We asked him if the vehicle had been stolen. He stated that it hadn't, that he
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had borrowed it from her. Upon the end of our interview, we did advise him that
she had reported the vehicle as stolen and he stated that he had the vehicle a few
more days than what he was supposed to have it.
MR. SCHULTZ: I'm going to make a hearsay objection that I think we already
have on record.
THE COURT: Objections overruled.
(Tr. Transcripts p. 122, line 6 through p. 122, line 14)
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. Mr. Miller appeals from this conviction.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The erroneous admission of the officer's hearsay statements constitutes harmful error.
The officers' statements regarding the Geo Metro that Mr. Miller was driving were inadmissible
hearsay and should not have been admitted into evidence.
Hearsay is generally inadmissible.

UT.

R. EVID. 802. In order for hearsay to be

admissible, the hearsay must fall into an exception created by either UT. R. EVID. 803 or 804.
An erroneous decision to exclude or admit evidence constitutes reversible error where the error is
harmful. State v. Alonzor 932 P.2d 606, 613 (Utah App. 1997), citing State v. Archuleta. 850
P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah 1994). The erroneous admission of evidence is harmful where there is no
other "convincing, properly admitted evidence of all essential elements of the case." State v.
Diaz. 859 P.2d 19, 23 (Utah App. 1993) citing State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) {quoting
United States v. Baker. 693 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
Here the police officers were permitted to testify over defense counsel's objection that the
Geo Metro that Mr. Miller left behind when he took Ms. Rodriguez's Tracker was "also" stolen.
This information about the Geo Metro was hearsay as was noted by the trial Court. However, the
-7-

trial Court nonetheless allowed it to come in. No hearsay exception exists for the admission of
this type of testimony, and, as such, it's admission was error.
This error was harmful as it completely undermined Mr. Miller's defense that he was only
borrowing Ms. Rodriguez's Tracker and would certainly have returned her car and camping gear
when he went back to get the Geo Metro. Further, the admission of these statements was
harmful as they were the only evidence of an essential element of the prosecution's case
regarding proof of Mr. Miller's intent to permanently deprive Ms. Rodriguez of her possessions
and Tracker. Because the erroneous admission of this hearsay was harmful, reversal of the trial
Court's decision is required. Therefore, Mr. Miller's conviction should be vacated and this matter
should be remanded to the trial Court for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
I. THE ADMISSION OF THE OFFICERS HEARSAY TESTIMONY WAS
HARMFUL ERROR WARRANTING REVERSAL OF THIS MATTER.
The outcome of Mr. Miller's jury trial was compromised by the improper introduction of
inadmissible hearsay testimony into evidence. Whether evidence is admissible is a question of
law, which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Diaz. 859 P.2d 19, 23 (Utah App. 1993). In this
case the admissibility of hearsay evidence is questioned. Hearsay is generally not admissible.
UT.

R. EVID. 802. However, hearsay is admissible if it falls within an exception to the hearsay

rule. These exceptions are found at UT. R. EVID. 803 and 804.
Here the officer's hearsay testimony did not fall into an exception carved out by either
UT.

R. EVID. 803 or 804. As such, it was not admissible and its admission over defense counsel's
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objection was error. Such an error warrants reversal only where the erroneous decision to admit
evidence is harmful. State v. Alonzo. 932 P.2d 606, 613 (Utah App. 1997), citing State v.
Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah 1994). The erroneous admission of evidence is harmful
where there is no other convincing, properly admitted evidence of an essential elements of the
case. State v. Diaz. 859 P.2d 19, 23 (Utah App. 1993) citing State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646 (Utah
1989) (quoting United States v. Baker. 693 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Moreover, error is
harmful if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome in the trial Court.
State v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) {other citation omitted). "Phrased
differently, the question is whether our confidence in the verdict has been undermined. Id
In Matsamas. the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial where the trial
Court allowed the State to call four different adults to testify as to statements made by a child
victim in the prosecution of the defendant for rape and child sodomy. State v. Matsamas. 808
P.2d 1048 at 1053 (Utah 1991). Although the child victim did testify, the child's testimony was
indicative of improper touching and oral sodomy, but was not particularly strong regarding
penetration. As such, the hearsay testimony was needed to prove "penetration," which is a
necessary element of rape. The trial Court allowed this hearsay testimony on the stated basis,
"that the evidence would assist the jury and Court in understanding whether the crime took place
or not." Id In other words, the judge allowed the hearsay evidence because it supplied a missing
part of the State's case. Under the Utah Rules of Evidence this is not a valid exception to the
hearsay rule. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed stating that "under these circumstances,
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we are unable to conclude that the admission of the extensive hearsay testimony constitutes
harmless error." Id.
Mr. Miller's case is similar in that the hearsay testimony was allowed without a specific
ruling as to the legal basis for its admissibility. It was error to allow it into evidence and it was
the only credible evidence offered to suggest that Mr. Miller had the requisite intent to
permanently deprive Ms. Rodriguez of her Tracker and camping gear.
A. THE EVIDENCE WAS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY.
Officer Kim Neil testified that the Geo Metro that Mr. Miller left behind when he
borrowed Ms. Rodriguez's Tracker was stolen. (R000089) This statement was hearsay as Officer
Neil had no personal knowledge that the Geo Metro was in fact stolen. (R000097) Mr. Miller
objected and moved for a mistrial. (R000089) The objection was initially sustained and the jury
was excused while the Court allowed Mr. Miller and the State to argue the merits of Mr. Miller's
motion for a mistrial. (R000089 and R000095).
The following was argued before the Court:
THE COURT: . . . The issue we need, the record will show the court's in session
outside the hearing of the jury. The issue we have is whether the conversation
that the defendant had with the police about the Metro is admissible or not and if
its inadmissable, then what should be the consequence of what was (inaudible)
having come in. You did talk to him about the Metro?
KIM NEAL: Yes I did.
THE COURT: And he told you that it was stolen, is that right?
KIM NEAL: It was listed as stolen and I knew it had been listed as stolen.
THE COURT: What did he tell you about it?
KIM NEAL: He said he had borrowed it from a friend.
MR. SCHULTZ: And that's what he testified, in his testimony, when you said
that he told you it was stolen, that's not what he testified.
THE COURT: Right. So the defendant claims that he borrowed it from a friend,
-10-

but you knew that it was listed stolen?
KIMNEAL: Yes.
THE COURT: There's no dispute that the fact that it was listed as stolen is
hearsay, and is therefore admissible.
MR. BENGE: Correct, your Honor. And I guess I would say first of all, I didn't
elicit that testimony. Number two, Mr. Schultz did bring up the issue with Ms.
Rodriguez that that vehicle was there and was still there at the time she left and
third there's been no motions in limiting file of this matter and this was a matter
that innocently came up.
THE COURT: Okay. I actually think that the jury is entitled to hear any
admissible evidence that would explain to them why it is he left the Metro there,
because I fully expect Mr. Schultz to point out to the jury, look he intended to
bring it back, he left his car there. The fact that it was listed as stolen is not
however, admissible, so that should not have come in.
MR. SCHULTZ: I guess I have some concerns as to whether or not its
(inaudible) or not. I mean, I don't gave any (inaudible), but I guess I have some
concerns to how innocent it is from the officer, I mean, I don't challenge the fact
that the defense, you know, was in the camp for too long of a time, but I don't
have to disclose my strategies in this and that and I have a lot of burdens that the
State has to carry and presumptions in my favor, but in this particular case, I
already have disclosed by strategy and that is that we're going for a lesser offense,
that this was a joy ride thing and I think that the officer may have gotten some
presumption of that as well as from my questioning, and that answer was not
really a response to the question that was asked. I mean, it was kind of
spontaneous and that's why my concern was in my objection. I think the court
should inquire to why that response was given, find out how that came up. It
wasn't something I could have made an object to before.
KIM NEAL: The question was asked what we talked about and what I asked the
subject on the ride into town and that was one of the things I asked him.
THE COURT: Okay. What did you ask him on the ride into town?
KIM NEAL: I asked him about the Geo Metro, where it came from, who it
belonged to, how he was in possession of it.
THE COURT: You see, that's all fine. But what you knew from another source is
not, because that's hearsay, you see. When somebody tells you something and
intending to assert that it's true, okay, sometimes we just, we just let people know
about things, but sometimes, what matters is that we told them or we said, but in
this case what matters is whether it's true that it's stolen or not and that was
someone, the person that knows that that other vehicle was stolen is somewhere
else, and of course, the defendant knows, I mean, he didn't admit it, so if the
defendant admitted, he had admitted to you that it was stolen, that's fine. But
bringing in that somebody else told you that, that's not fine. You're conversation
-11-

with him, that's fine, except if you say to him, well this is reported stolen, of
course, then that introduces someone else's hearsay statement. Well, I don't like
it. (Tr. Transcript p. 95, line 22 through p. 99 line 4)

Thereafter, over the objection of defense counsel, Officer White testified that the Geo
Metro that Mr. Miller was driving was stolen. (R000122)1 This testimony completely
undermined Mr. Miller's defense that he was merely borrowing Ms. Rodriguez's Tracker, and
would have returned it when he came back to get his own (R000159)2
No hearsay exceptions support the Court's decision to allow the admission of this
extremely damaging hearsay testimony. While the Court does not offer a clear explanation as to
the basis for having allowed this hearsay into evidence, the court appears, as in Matsamas. to
base its ruling on the grounds that the hearsay testimony was vital to the State's case. The Court
states, "I think that the jury is entitled to hear any admissible evidence that would explain to them
why it is he left the Metro there because I fully expect [defense counsel] to point out to the jury,
look he intended to bring it back, he left his car there." (Transcript p. 97) The test for the
admissibility of hearsay is unrelated to any need on the part of the jury. Accordingly, this
determination was incorrect and this evidence should have been excluded.

1

Although the objection to Officer Neil's earlier testimony that the car had been stolen was
sustained, no curative language was afforded the defendant as the Court later determined that it
was appropriate to allow in this testimony. Accordingly, the jury received from two law
enforcement officers testimony that the car Mr. Miller was driving, was also stolen.
2

It is important to note that Mr. Miller went to the trouble of leaving his Geo Metro in Ms.
Rodriguez's parking spot at the campground when he borrowed her vehicle as if to suggest to her
that he would be back and was not hiding the fact that he had borrowed her vehicle (R000065).
-12-

If, in the alternative, the Court believed that the hearsay problem was corrected by
allowing the officer to quote his own statements made earlier to the defendant regarding the
status of this vehicle, this too was an erroneous determination. Quoting oneself compounds the
problem as now the officer's statements became not mere hearsay, but double hearsay.
Further, Mr. Miller's statements regarding keeping the borrowed Geo Metro a few days
longer than he was supposed to keep it, do not, as the Court suggests, equate an admission that
the Geo Metro was stolen. Even if it did, such an admission would not turn the otherwise
inadmissible hearsay offered by Officer White and Officer Neil into admissible evidence.
Certainly it was proper to allow the officers to testify that Mr. Miller admitted to keeping the
Geo Metro a little longer than he was supposed to, but Mr. Miller's statements to the officers did
nothing to cure the fact that the information about the Geo Metro being reported stolen was
hearsay. The information was hearsay and it was error to admit it into evidence.
B. THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF THIS HEARSAY WAS
HARMFUL.
Under the circumstances, it cannot be concluded that the admission of the extensive
hearsay testimony of two police officers regarding the ownership status of the Geo Metro
constitutes harmless error. It's admission unfairly deprived Mr. Miller of his theory of the case.
As his attorney argued in closing, it would certainly appear that if you took someone else's car
and left your own in it's place, that you would return at some time to retrieve your own vehicle
and return the vehicle that you had borrowed. Moreover this hearsay evidence erroneously
admitted is the only "convincing" piece of evidence admitted to show Mr. Miller's intent to do
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anything but eventually return Ms. Rodriguez's car and belongings. State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19,
23 (Utah App. 1993) citing State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) (quoting United States v.
Baker. 693 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
There is no question that the jury noticed this hole in the State's case. They showed their
concern while counsel was arguing about Mr. Miller's motion for a mistrial by sending the Judge
a note which read "Did Deputy Kim Neil have any conversation with the defendant regarding the
Geo Metro? Don't ask this if it will cause a mistrial." (Transcript p. 100) Obviously the jury
wanted to know this information in an effort to determine what Mr. Miller's intentions were with
regard to Ms. Rodriguez's Tracker. Accordingly, there is a reasonable likelihood that this error
effected the outcome of this trial as it is both possible and probable that absent this hearsay
evidence the jury would have convicted Mr. Miller only of unlawful control over a motor vehicle
as was explained in the jury instructions and was argued for by defense counsel (Transcript p.
159) (See Jury Instructions attached at Addendum A).
Under the circumstances of this case, it is impossible to have any confidence that this
verdict has not been compromised by the admission of this hearsay testimony into evidence.
Accordingly, it is appropriate for this Court to reverse the trial Court's decision and remand this
matter for a new trial.

-14-

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant is respectfully requesting that this Court reverse the
decision of the trial Court and remand for a new trial.
DATED THIS / u d a y of r ^ j J L * ^

. 1999.
J/

tfaW J. Morgan
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this the J\0 day of r^V\PA (JU*>uJ'. 1999,1 caused to be
served two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief by first-class postage prepaid mail to the following:
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Addendum - A -

INSTRUCTION NO.

b

If you find the elements of Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, as set forth in the
preceding Instruction,liave not been established by the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, you should then consider if the evidence establishes the elements of the offense of
Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt.
Before you can convict the Defendant of Unlawful Control Over a Motor
Vehicle, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
1.

That on or about the 16th day of June, 1998, the Defendant in Grand

County, knowingly exercised unauthorized control of a vehicle, and;
2.

Without consent of the owner or lawful custodian.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each of the essential elements of the
offense of Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt, you
should convict the Defendant of the crime of Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle.
If the evidence has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt one or more of
the said elements, then you must find the Defendant not guilty of the crime of Unlawful
Control Over a Motor Vehicle.

Addendum ~B~

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COliBT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

''

Crirainal No. 9817-114
Held in the Courtroom of said Court, at Moab, Grand
County, State of Utah, on September 16, 1993, present the
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Against: JONATHAN RAYMOND MILLER,
DOB: 12/0 6/67
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE PRISON
William L, Benge, for Plaintiff
William L. Schultz, for Defendant
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing •
judgment in this case, and the defendant being present in Court
and represented by counsel, William 1. Schultz, and defendant
having heretofore been found guilty by a jury of the crimes of:
COUNT I; THEFT, a Second Degree Felony
COUNT 2: THEFT a Class A Misdemeanor,
and the defendant stating to the Court that there is no legal
reason to advance why judgment should not be pronounced, the
Court now pronounces the judgment and sentence of the law as
follows, to-wit:

That you, JONATHAN RAYMOND MILLER, be

imprisoned in the UTAH STATE PRISON, in the County of Salt Lake,
FOR A TERM OF NOT LESS THAN ONE (1) YEAR NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN
(15) YEARS on Count 1 and FOR A TERM OF ONE (1) YEAR IN THE GRAND
COUNTY JAIL on Count 2.
It is ORDERED that said prison and jail terms be served
concurrently.
It is further ORDERED that defendant be given credit
for time already served in the amount of 90 days.

2

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the fU

day of September,

1998, I hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the above to William L. Schuitz, Attorney for
Defendant, 69 E. Center St,, Moab, Utah 84532; Department of
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, 1165 S. Hwy. 191, St. 3,
Moab, Utah
Utah

84532; Grand County Sheriff, 125 E. Center, Moab,

84532; Utah State Prison, P. O..3ox 250, Draper, Utah

S4 02 0.
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